Τρόπος ὑπάρξεως bei den Kappadokischen Vätern und bei St. Maximus Confessor In dieser Arbeit werden wir versuchen, zu erörtern, was der Begriff τρόπος ὑπάρξεως bei den Kappadokischen Vätern im Kontext ihrer Triadologie bedeutet. Unserer Meinung zufolge ist die Reduktion der Bedeutung des Begriffs τρόπος ὑπάρξεως auf individuelles Wesen mit Charakteristika kein entsprechendes Abbild der Absicht der Väter. Ganz im Gegensatz, der Begriff τρόπος ὑπάρξεως dient bei ihnen als Unterstützung für die Konstituierung des Begriffs der Hypostase, welcher neben der (...) Bedeutung eines individuellen Wesens mit Charakteristika auch Relation als Schlüs-selmoment ihrer personalistischen Ontologie besitzt. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to challenge the prevailing polemic between ‘necessary’ emanation and ‘free’ creation. I begin by arguing for the presence of freedom and volition in the emanationism of Plotinus. I then move on to explore the role of necessity in the creationism of Maximus. In both cases, I rely upon a twofold schematisation of freedom and necessity to dissolve the dichotomy between them effectively. Having levelled the playing field, so to speak, I conclude that, all (...) things being equal, one does find in Maximus (and Christian thinkers generally) a heightened sense of divine volition and relationality beyond that of the pagan Neoplatonists. This greater emphasis upon the freedom of the divine will, however, has little bearing on whether Maximus's doctrine of creation is ‘emanationist’ or ‘creationist’. Instead, it stems from a biblically inspired sense of the One God as intimately involved in His creation which, though derived from God, is crucially other than God. (shrink)

The author analyses the theology of Saint Maximus the Confessor and its interpretation in modern theology. The great work of Hans Urs von Balthasar “The Cosmic Liturgy” began a new theological focus on the profoundness of Saint Maximus synthesis which was continued by several scholars: Policarp Sherwood, J. M. Gariguess, J. C. Larchet, Andrew Louth etc. The author analyses especially the work “Theologie de l’agonie du Christ” belonging to François-Marie Lethel (Paris, 1979). In a critical approach to (...) this work he finds major misinterpretations and established several erroneous trends in the Maximian studies. (shrink)

The study of Maximus the Confessor’s thought has flourished in recent years: international conferences, publications and articles, new critical editions and translations mark a torrent of interest in the work and influence of perhaps the most sublime of the Byzantine Church Fathers. It has been repeatedly stated that the Confessor’s thought is of eminently philosophical interest. However, no dedicated collective scholarly engagement with Maximus the Confessor as a philosopher has taken place—and this volume attempts to (...) start such a discussion. Apart from Maximus’ relevance and importance for philosophy in general, a second question arises: should towering figures of Byzantine philosophy like Maximus the Confessor be included in an overview of the European history of philosophy, or rather excluded from it—as is the case today with most histories of European philosophy? Maximus’ philosophy challenges our understanding of what European philosophy is. In this volume, we begin to address these issues and examine numerous aspects of Maximus’ philosophy—thereby also stressing the interdisciplinary character of Maximian studies. (shrink)

It has been repeatedly stated that Maximus the Confessor’s (c. 580–662) thought is of eminently philosophical interest, and his work has been approached from a philosophical point of view in a number of monographs. However, no dedicated collective scholarly engagement on Maximus the Confessor as a philosopher has been produced. Although Maximus’ treatises reflect a strong philosophical background, prior research has failed to determine with clarity his specific philosophical sources and predilections. Besides apologetic purposes, he (...) referred occasionally to purely philosophical topics, which are more adequate to reveal Maximus’ philosophical education and knowledge. Among these topics are representation and imagination, which have a significant role in epistemology. Maximus’ epistemology proves his dependence on ancient Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle, Stoicism and Alexandrian Neoplatonism. A few centuries later, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Al-Farabi (c.870—c.950), the founder of medieval Arabic philosophy, dealt with the same topics in his epistemology. Al-Farabi’s philosophy has been studied extensively and we have a good idea about his possible sources. There are several indications that Al-Farabi and Maximus the Confessor share common insights, for they resort to the same ancient Greek tradition. In this paper, I attempt to compare Maximus’ and Al-Farabi’s epistemology in order to reveal affinities and differences that permit us to analyze and assess Maximus’ philosophical education. (shrink)

In defining the theological problem of participation as the question of how created beings, namely human beings, can participate in the transcendent Uncreated God towards deification without a pantheistic blurring of essences, this article examines the Christologically intuitive way in which Maximus the Confessor would have responded. Specifically, Maximus’ Cyrilline Chalcednonianism, featuring an unconfused perichoretic union between Christ's two natures in his hypostatic union, serves directly as an apologetic and hermeneutic for humanity's and creation's participation in God. (...) In addition, taking into account the scholarly debate over Maximus’ understanding of the relationship between the Logos and the logoi, it is argued that this indirectly provides a second Christological way forward to resolve the problem at hand, particularly when the two types of logoi are correctly distinguished. Insofar as the Logos and the logoi, not to mention the notions of participation and deification, were viewed by Maximus through his Cyrilline Chalcedonian lens, his Cyrilline Chalcednonian Christology was ultimately his answer to the theological problem of participation. (shrink)

In defining the theological problem of participation as the question of how created beings, namely human beings, can participate in the transcendent Uncreated God towards deification without a pantheistic blurring of essences, this article examines the Christologically intuitive way in which Maximus the Confessor would have responded. Specifically, Maximus’ Cyrilline Chalcednonianism, featuring an unconfused perichoretic union between Christ's two natures in his hypostatic union, serves directly as an apologetic and hermeneutic for humanity's and creation's participation in God. (...) In addition, taking into account the scholarly debate over Maximus’ understanding of the relationship between the Logos and the logoi, it is argued that this indirectly provides a second Christological way forward to resolve the problem at hand, particularly when the two types of logoi are correctly distinguished. Insofar as the Logos and the logoi, not to mention the notions of participation and deification, were viewed by Maximus through his Cyrilline Chalcedonian lens, his Cyrilline Chalcednonian Christology was ultimately his answer to the theological problem of participation. (shrink)

Saint Maximus the Confessor’s voluminous corpus constitutes a coherent and lucid philosophical and theological system, notwithstanding the existence of obscure, difficult, and at times even contradictory passages. A question stemming from Maximus’ work is whether the “intelligible creation” is imperishable or corruptible, which would have important implications for a number of other issues like the created / uncreated distinction, Maximus’ relationshipto Neoplatonism, et al. However, Maximus provides us with contradictory passages concerning this subject, characterizing the (...) noēte ktisis as both corruptibleand imperishable. While in certain passages of the Ambigua ad Ioannem he states that created intelligible beings move “according to corruption,” excludingthe possibility of natural incorruptibility for them, in other passages he states that the noēte ktisis possesses imperishability by nature, and not merely by grace. Inthis paper I will attempt to examine this apparent inconsistency on the basis of these two examples and to discuss which of both positions should be consideredas Maximus’ “primary” position. (shrink)

Saint Maximus the Confessor’s voluminous corpus constitutes a coherent and lucid philosophical and theological system, notwithstanding the existence of obscure, difficult, and at times even contradictory passages. A question stemming from Maximus’ work is whether the “intelligible creation” is imperishable or corruptible, which would have important implications for a number of other issues like the created / uncreated distinction, Maximus’ relationship to Neoplatonism, et al. However, Maximus provides us with contradictory passages concerning this subject, characterizing (...) the noēte ktisis as both corruptible and imperishable. While in certain passages of the Ambigua ad Ioannem he states that created intelligible beings move “according to corruption,” excluding the possibility of natural incorruptibility for them, in other passages he states that the noēte ktisis possesses imperishability by nature, and not merely by grace. In this paper I will attempt to examine this apparent inconsistency on the basis of these two examples and to discuss which of both positions should be considered as Maximus’ “primary” position. (shrink)

Saint Maximus the Confessor’s voluminous corpus constitutes a coherent and lucid philosophical and theological system, notwithstanding the existence of obscure, difficult, and at times even contradictory passages. A question stemming from Maximus’ work is whether the “intelligible creation” is imperishable or corruptible, which would have important implications for a number of other issues like the created / uncreated distinction, Maximus’ relationship to Neoplatonism, et al. However, Maximus provides us with contradictory passages concerning this subject, characterizing (...) the noēte ktisis as both corruptible and imperishable. While in certain passages of the Ambigua ad Ioannem he states that created intelligible beings move “according to corruption,” excluding the possibility of natural incorruptibility for them, in other passages he states that the noēte ktisis possesses imperishability by nature, and not merely by grace. In this paper I will attempt to examine this apparent inconsistency on the basis of these two examples and to discuss which of both positions should be considered as Maximus’ “primary” position. (shrink)

Giving justice to Maximus any philosophy wich does not include mysticism will be false as philosophy. Our metaphysics must be mystical in order to be rational. In Maximus’ doctrine, then, Christ comes not to destroy but to fulfill the metaphysics of mystery elaborated by the philosophers. For him there can be no separation between philosophy and theology, or between natural and revealed theology. Thereby, Christology and liturgical mysticism are not additional to a neoplatonic, aristotelian, and other methaphysics. (...) class='Hi'>Maximus concern was to continue, not the philosophical tradition of the Aristotelian commentators, but the theological one of the Fathers. He was not an Aristotelian commentator himself. The union and distinction are basic logical concepts in Maximus’ thinking, but the Chalcedonian logic is the application of these concepts. Only in this way one can talk about Christianization of aristotelian logic. St. Maximus the Confessor synthesized Aristotelianism influences with those of Platonism in order to exceed the daring speculations of cosmology origeniene. He had an extraordinary ability to combine metaphysical requirements with the effort of defining the faith dogma, and the monastic experiences with the depth thinking, succeeding to propose a new conception in which converge all cultural and religious influences. This study is analyzing the relationship between logoi and energeia (the intentional or “logical” energeia and the ontology of divine energy as ontological “logic”) within the maximian cosmology, by referring to the palamite theology. The concept of logoi for St. Maximus play a role similar in many respects to that of energy (energeiai) in Cappadocian Fathers, but the functional similarity it should not lead to the identification rationales with the energies. (shrink)

St. Maximus the Confessor claims that the logos of created beings represents their essence as an icon. This claim gives us the opportunity to understand the term essence as an dynamic reality and not as a static given. Essence is not something that the being is, but what it is supposed to be. The idea of icon is herein present as ultimately ontological. The icon is no mirror of reality, but rather its eschatological realization. That which will be (...) uncovers the truth of the being. This way, St. Maxius has founded a dynamic ontology, which is a fundamental step away from the Hellenic heritage. The equalization of the essence of beings and icon is only possible in an Eucharistic view of the world, wherein the Eucharist represents in an iconic way the presence of the eschatological truth in history. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 780-795, July 2022.

The Aristotelian categories are a fundamental element in Eriugena’s philosophical system on account of his realist view of dialectic. He received his texts concerning the categories from Boethius and the De decem catagoriis, but key ideas in his treatment of them—namely, the metaphysical importance of dialectic, the unknowability of essence, and the origin of being in place and time, ideas fundamentally rooted in Byzantine developments of the Christology of Chalcedon—are taken from Maximus the Confessor. Eriugena’s work on the (...) categories represents an attempt, much misunderstood, to assimilate the richness of the Eastern tradition to Western philosophical and theological method. This paper examines the synthesis of Maximus’s ideas with Ciceronian and Boethian elements in Eriugena’s striking treatment of the Aristotelian Categories. (shrink)

Aristotle produced several arguments to vindicate the futura contingentia and to refute the conception of modalities which do not allow incidental facts. This conception was coined mainly by Diodorus Cronus and implied the view that whatever may happen, is to happen necessarily. Although Aristotle condemned this view and refuted the theology which it implies, Diodorean modalities were employed by the scholastics to support their theology. Abaelard’s Diodorean formula reads: God wishes no more and no less than what He is able (...) to do – i. e. God’s ability to do something implies necessity. In the Summa theologiae, Thomas Aquinas employed Diodorean modalities along with this result of Abaelard’s. Leibniz himself confessed his debt to Diodorean modalities as well as to the work of Abaelard in formulating his own ontological proof. Kurt Gödel was under the influence of Leibniz when he wrote his »Ontological Proof«, which employs Diodorean modalities. — For the Greek-speaking scholars of the Middle Ages, however, Aristotelian influences were stronger than Diodorean as regards theory building on modalities. Philosophers from the East from the 2nd to the 11th century A.D., such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, John Philoponus and Michael Psellos, condemned Diodorean modalities as fallacious. In the same period, Greek Church Fathers such as Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus Confessor and John of Damascus gave an orthodox account of God and the modalities, according to which God is able to do whatever He wishes. The absence of Leibniz-like modal ontological proofs in the Greek tradition seems more plausible under these circumstances. (shrink)

There has been much attention devoted in the last decade and especially in the last few years to Maximus the Confessor?s beliefs concerning sexual difference and its removal. The most important text on this topic is Ambiguum 41. There has been mixed reception of this text, with some scholars advocating that Maximus believes that sexual difference was absent from original human nature and will return to such a state in the eschaton; and other scholars believing that this (...) should be read as a metaphorical absence. This article re-evaluates the text in question and argues that the former position should be maintained. It goes some way to bring together current scholarship on the text and to answers questions that arise from the opposing reading. (shrink)

In recent years, several scholars have hinted at a resemblance between Maximus the Confessor's logoi cosmology and evolutionary biology. In this article, I develop these suggestions further and claim that the logoi (divine ideas or wills) do indeed behave in an evolutionary fashion, diverging hierarchically and interactively from the Logos. However, there the similarity ends, for the logoi are also purposeful, inviolable, and good, unlike evolution which is said to be random, ever‐changing, and cruel. But rather than abandon (...) the logoi–evolution congruity, I argue that, by harnessing theological resources from across the Eastern tradition, one can integrate Maximus’ logoi vision more fully, resulting in an “incarnationally panentheistic” model of God's action and presence in evolution. More speculatively, within canonical Darwinism, the underlying (good) evolutionary motion of the logoi might be discernible in variation and adaptation, with the “evil” of competition and natural selection being “garments of skin” conceded by God as part of a simultaneous creation and cosmic fall. (shrink)

Maximus the Confessor distinguishes three stages in the spiritual becoming of man: vita passibilis i.e. the way of life in that man is living under the reign of the bodily passions, apatheia as state of liberation from the reign of the lower passions, and vita passiva as modus vivendi in which the human makes the personal experience of the revelation and the presence of God. Thereby being man means according to Maximus suffering under the rule of someone (...) - divine or demonic - or something. The human condition is especially passive. Even contemplation (theōria) becomes in this approach a kind of passion: the passive experience of the presence of God. Although there is an old tradition in the classical Greek culture concerning the equivalency mathein-pathein (from Aeschylus to Aristotle and until Neo-Platonist thinkers like Proclus) which is received in the Christian tradition first of all by Denys the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor is one of the first Christian theologians who tries to reconstruct the classical conception concerning the typology of the human ways of life (vita activa-vita contemplativa) as being based on passion: passion of lower impulses, passion of the demonic temptations and sins, but also passion of the overwhelming divine presence. Man can only lead a passionate life as slave of the lower passions (pathēmata) and as such of the devil or as slave of God in the Holy Spirit. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the ontological status of virtue as an instance of love within the cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor. It shows that we may posit the real existence of a “virtue” in so far as we understand it to have its basis in, and to be an instance of love. Since God is love and the virtues are logoi, it becomes possible and beneficial to parallel the relationship between love and the virtues with Maximus’ exposition (...) of the Logos and the logoi. In particular, Vladimir Cvetković’s interpretation of the circle and radii analogy will be utilized. It will be shown that when one practices a virtue, one is practicing and participating in love, and, by extension, partaking in God. Within the context of Maximus’ cosmology, this means that practicing virtue and love is the ultimate purpose of humanity in its journey to gather all creation to communion with God. This paper is primarily an exposition of primary sources from St. Maximus, but discussion of the ontology of virtue is made with a view to bringing it into dialogue with modern theories of virtue ethics. This paper arises in part as a response to the August 2013 papers by Andrew Louth and Paul M. Blowers on the need for increased scholarship on Maximus and virtue ethics. (shrink)

Rad nastoji da predstavi filozofsku argumentaciju u prilog hriscanskoj ideji stvaranja sveta izlozenu u delu autora iz VII veka Maksima Ispovednika. Maksim Ispovednik je svoje ucenje o stvaranju razvio prativsi filozofske argumente svojih hriscanskih prethodnika, pre svih Grigorija Niskog, Nemesija Emeskog i Dionisija Areopagita. Srz Maksimove argumentcije slicna je ucenju o stvaranju sveta aleksandrijskog filozofa Jovana Filopona, ali njegovo ucenje obogaceno je i idejama pomenutih hriscanskih autora koje on dodatno razvija. Neke od ideja koje cine strukturu Maksimove filozofije stvaranja jesu: (...) petostruka podela bica, koja se vrhuni u podeli na stvorenu i nestvorenu prirodu, zatim pokret stvorenih bica prema Bogu koji je jedini istinski cilj njihovog kretanja, predvecno postojanje sveta u logosima kao izrazima Bozanske volje, Bozje promisljanje ne samo opstih nacela vec i individualnih bica i obozenje celokupne tvorevine kao prvenstvene svrhe stvaranja. Maksim svoje ideje vesto oblikuje koristeci se podjednako aristotelovskim, stoickim i neoplatonistickim filozofskim vokabularom. (shrink)

This essay seeks to abstract from the works of Maximus the Confessor (580–662) a ‘theory’ of virtue ethics that engages Maximus’s own categories and language while still developing conversation with contemporary virtue ethics. First is a reconstruction of the larger cosmological (and moral) ‘narrative’—the oikonomia Maximus sees embodied in sacred history—that frames his essentially teleological understanding of the formation of virtue in created beings. The second part of the essay explores Maximus’s doctrine of the moral (...) self as a synthesis of ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ dimensions, and details three identifiable protocols by which moral agents cultivate the Christian virtues: first, the development of intellectual virtues such as prudence that serve clear vision (theoria) of worthy moral ends; second, the appropriate ‘use’ of the passible faculties of desire and temper in alliance with reason; and third, the conditioning of the virtues within moral communities (monastery or church) characterized by relations of accountability, imitation, and the traditioning of moral wisdom. (shrink)

Maximus the Confessor's belief that the Incarnation would have happened without a Fall is a key facet of his thought, yet contradicts portions of his corpus which state that God became human due to sin. I assert that Maximus affirms a prelapsarian motive of the Incarnation for two reasons: his conception of deification as participation and understanding of humanity's original vocation. Deification and vocation are presented by Maximus in such a way that they could have only (...) been fulfilled through Christ's Incarnation; the joining of human and divine natures is not a soteriological necessity. Analysing accounts of the Fall of Adam in both the Questiones ad Thalassium and the Ambiguum demonstrate that the Confessor reconciles the historic need for salvation with the will of God from all eternity. I argue that a reading of Ambigua 41 in the context of the Maximian corpus reveals an all-encompassing reason for the Incarnation. Philanthropy (φιλανθρωπία), God's love for humanity, is the motive (σκοπός) for the Incarnation that embraces the divine preexistent intention without contradicting soteriology. (shrink)

In this essay, I show how the virtues, for Maximus the Confessor, contribute to the formation of a positive orientation toward (a deep and abiding desire for) the relevant epistemic goods (e.g., contemplation of God in and through nature, illumination of divine truths, wisdom, and experiential knowledge of God). The first section offers a brief overview of how three character-based virtue epistemologies envision the role of the intellectual virtues in the cognitive life. The second section draws attention to (...) Maximus’s understanding of the relationship between the virtues and the relevant epistemic goods. The third section argues that a relationship of this sort entails a seamless connection (though without confusion) between the practical and contemplative aspects of deiform existence. The fourth section clarifies how select virtues foster within the self a praiseworthy desire for the relevant epistemic goods. (shrink)

The term prohairesis has a long history; its usage is crucial for the development and understanding of basic ethical and anthropological assumptions in ancient Hellenic philosophy. In this article the author analyses the most important moments for the semantic transformation of this term, with particular reference to the implications of its usage in Byzantine theological and philosophical heritage, with the ultimate expression in work of St Maximus the Confessor and his christological synthesis. The equation between the terms prohairesis (...) and gnome and their separation from the authentic human nature, as well as the usage of the term thelesis for the original „human will“, represents the thorough revision of the antique philosophical heritage which could be compared with the distinction of the terms ousia and hypostasis by Cappadocian Fathers. In this article the author will show the extent to which and the way in which Byzantine theological and philosophical thought adopted and transformed its own Hellenic heritage. (shrink)

Maximus the Confessor was an important Byzantine thinker, the 'father of Byzantine theology'. This study describes his metaphysical world-view. The discussion covers Maximus' doctrine of creation, the Logos and the logoi, the cosmic order, the activities or energies of God, and how created beings may participate in God.

On September 1 st 2017, Pope Francis and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew issued a Joint Message for the World Day of Prayer for Creation. The gesture reveals the church’s efforts “to breathe with two lungs” on the urgent matter of climate change and ecological sustainability. But, the church leaders have also insisted on a philosophical and religious reflection on technology if humanity is to take responsibility for the environment. In particular, they have sought to correct the wrong interpretation of the (...) biblical imperative to “have dominion over” the creatures of the Earth and to “subdue it” that for centuries has condoned ecological abuse, in particular in the name of technological progress. In this paper, I propose a theological reflection on Homo technologicus through the writings of the seventh century monk Maximus the Confessor and the twentieth century Catholic priest Romano Guardini. Maximus offers a systematic account of human techne as reflecting the mark of sin, while being God’s gift to assist us in stewarding creation. Guardini offers a challenging argument for the moral nature of technology in our times. In an age where technology extends human power, even as it seemingly takes on a life of its own, Maximus’ and Guardini’s insights on the “technological human” offer a renewed Christian anthropology that, in the tradition of natural law reasoning, can ground a global ethic for a “sustainable and integral development.”. (shrink)